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“What is Bread?” The Anthropology of Belief 
Charles Lindholm 
ETHOS 
“What is Bread?” 
In this article, I contrast the ideal-typical models for the verification of belief proposed by 
Max Weber (external and meaning-centered) and Emile Durkheim (internal and 
emotional). I then put forward a continuum of types of belief legitimization based on 
these models and place the articles in this collection within this framework to 
demonstrate the complex interplay between modes of belief corroboration and to provide 
a theoretical basis for making cross-cultural comparisons of belief maintenance. [belief, 
religion, Durkheim, Weber, comparative analysis] 
 
A well-known Sufi story goes like this: “A Sufi was accused of apostasy by four learned 
scholars. He told the judge that he would accept the death penalty if his accusers could 
satisfactorily answer one question. The question was: ‘What is bread?’ The first scholar said: 
‘Bread is a combination of flour and water, shaped and baked in various ways, according to 
cultural traditions and personal preference.’ The second said: ‘Bread is the staff of life.’ The 
third said: ‘Bread is the gift of God.’ The fourth said: ‘Bread is a mystery.’ The Sufi turned to the 
judge. ‘My accusers cannot agree on what bread is. How can they know whether I am an 
apostate?’ He was released.” 
For the faithful, religious belief, like bread, is tangible and nourishing. But, when 
analyzed by intellectuals, belief is likely to become abstract and insubstantial. The articles in this 
collection have avoided this problem by not asking what belief is, but instead use discourse 
analysis to reveal how believers convince themselves that their beliefs are true. The introduction 
to the articles laid the groundwork for this approach by revisiting some previous debates about 
the nature of belief. In my concluding commentary I will build on this foundation by first 
describing ideal typical Weberian and Durkheimian models of belief as externally or internally 
verified.1 Next, I shall present a continuum of externally and internally legitimized beliefs, and 
then argue that the ethnographic material presented in these articles correlates with, and 
complicates, these paradigmatic forms. 
Before beginning, a necessary caveat. I recognize that there any number of other theories 
of belief besides those offered by Weber and Durkheim to which I might usefully refer. My 
reasons for limiting myself are practical, theoretical, and personal. The practical reason is space. 
The theoretical reason is that these contrasting paradigms continue to provide useful frameworks 
for the analysis of social life. Their prestige is a testament to their salience. Finally, I rely on 
Weber and Durkheim for personal reasons: I know their works well; their theories have oriented 
me throughout my career. So I believe (using that word very consciously) in their models 
because I have tested them in practice, because they have proven their usefulness, and because 
they have long provided me with meaningful and personally satisfying modes of approaching 
and apprehending complexity. 
[h1]Beliefs about Belief 
Anthropology has had an ambivalent relationship with the notion of belief, both as a 
concept and as a motivating reality. Much of this history has been covered already in the 
introduction and in some of the articles, so I needn’t go into too much detail here. Suffice it to 
say that some iconoclasts, most notably Rodney Needham, wanted to get rid of the whole 
concept, arguing that it was vague and lacked specific cross-cultural equivalents (Needham 
1972). In fact, by his strict criteria almost all anthropological terms would be eliminated in favor 
of more “experience near” local terminology.2 Notwithstanding, most anthropologists have 
carried on without worrying too much about the precise meaning of the indigenous word for 
belief, just as they have made do with other, equally vague, but equally useful, terms (incl. the 
word culture). According to their predilections, researchers have generally assumed that beliefs 
are ideological superstructures expressing underlying power relations, or windows into the secret 
tensions of social organization, or even, for structuralists, revelations of the hidden workings of 
the mind itself. Whatever the approach, it was usually thought that beliefs had a coherence and 
constancy of their own—they formed a system. It was also taken for granted that believers were 
impelled to act, in large measure, because they adhered to the values imparted to them by their 
beliefs.3 
In the United States, the meaning centered operational approach to belief associated with 
Clifford Geertz predominated (Geertz 1973). Geertz’s notion was that belief systems provided 
both “models of” and “models for” social life, as people tracked back and forth between the 
theories and practices proposed and exemplified in their respective worldviews. But after a long 
reign, this approach was attacked from a number of different directions. One powerful critique 
was leveled by Talal Asad (1983, 1993), who argued that Geertz mistakenly projected a Western 
and specifically Protestant worldview, which assumed the priority of thought, meaning, and 
agency, onto the religious faiths of others. Using examples drawn mainly from Medieval Europe, 
Asad proposed that belief, at least in some circumstances, was derived from embodied 
knowledge inculcated by habit and monkish discipline. Ideas were less important than 
performance; agency was less important than participation. In sum, Geertz placed belief within a 
culturally constituted framework of rationality, agency, and the search for meaning, while Asad 
understood belief as a derivative of emotionally charged habitual participation in collective 
experience.4 
This debate is an extension of the 19th-century opposition between the sociological 
schools of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Geertz was hugely influenced by Weber’s method 
of verstehen—reaching understanding of motives through an imaginative identification with the 
worldviews of others (although, crucially, not with their emotional states, which remained out of 
analytical range). Through verstehen, the researcher could intuitively grasp and then explain the 
various normative paths that actors followed to achieve the goals valued in their particular 
cultural universe. These value orientations imparted meaning to human suffering—although 
existential pain was never wholly allayed. Weber argued that for the purposes of sociological 
analysis it must be assumed that actors are rational—they will do whatever makes sense to them 
in their struggles to reach the goals valued within a specific sacralized value system, whether that 
system is dominated by the mystical asceticism of Hinduism, the warrior ethic of Islam, or the 
instrumental orientation of capitalism. However, what “makes sense” will vary according to the 
positions, personalities, tastes and capacities of the actors, so there is always a fair degree of 
indeterminacy in Weber’s motivational model. 
Durkheim too assumed that the essential motive for the construction and maintenance of 
a sacralized worldview is the wish to escape from suffering, but for him the cause of suffering—
at least in complex “organic” societies—was the loss of the integrative collective experiences 
that were characteristic of simpler “segmentary” social organizations. Although he ostensibly 
gave a central place to rationality in his famous definition of religion as “a unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things … which unite into one single moral community 
called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim 1965:62), the emphasis in his work 
was on emotion and practice. As Durkheim writes, “we must look for determining causes in 
sensation and impulsions of the sensibility, not in concepts” (1984:232). “Intelligence … accepts 
without discussion the theoretical postulates demanded by action” (Durkheim 1965:412). 
According to Durkheim, the most important originating force inculcating belief in human 
beings was the immediate experience of the healing power of primordial collective rituals, where 
“men are more confident because they feel themselves stronger; and they really are stronger, 
because forces which were languishing are now reawakened in the consciousness” (Durkheim 
1965:387). The division between sacred and profane, Durkheim argued, reflected the primal 
experience of self-loss in the ecstatic ritual performances that stood in radical contrast to the 
solitude and finitude of the profane individual. Moral life, intelligence, symbolism, language, 
and indeed humanity itself, were products of this transformative experience, which drew 
participants out of themselves and fused them into a transcendent collective wherein “it is no 
longer a simple individual who speaks, it is a group incarnate and personified” (Durkheim 
1965:241). Unfortunately, but inevitably, with the evolution of complex “organic” society the 
sense of shared collective participation was attenuated; paradoxically, the more people became 
interdependent, the less aware they were of their interconnections until, in the modern era, all 
that remains to be worshipped is the regent self and its desires. The result is alienation and 
anomie. 
The opposition between these two ideal typical paradigms is evident: interest, agency, 
and rational action on the one side; emotion, the collective, and ritual on the other side. Of 
course, the reality is far more complicated. For example, Durkheim also argued that all societies 
manufacture complex systems of classification that order their universe into patterned symbolic 
relationships of opposition and analogy, arranged in taxonomies of hierarchical inclusion that 
extend out in intersecting webs (Durkheim and Mauss 1963). The connections and oppositions of 
binary classification systems provide what Durkheim called the “vast symbolism” that is at the 
core of human life and society. Durkheim’s thoughts on primitive classification prepared the 
ground for structuralism, and prefigured advances in cognitive and linguistic anthropology, 
moving toward the schema theory that is invoked in several of the articles in this collection. 
Meanwhile, although he argued that sociology must focus on the conscious pursuit of 
valued goals, Weber also assumed that the most fundamental and satisfying alleviation of human 
suffering is not to be found in reasoned discourse or the construction of systematic theodicies, 
but in immediate transformative experience as expressed in the epileptoid ecstasy of the 
charismatic shaman-magician, who, by convening and enacting the healing ritual of death and 
rebirth, stimulates the congregation to momentarily forget their suffering while immersed in the 
“objectless acosmism of love” (Weber 1972:330). As he writes, “for the devout the sacred value, 
first and above all, has been a psychological state in the here and now. Primarily this state 
consists in the emotional attitude per se” (Weber 1972:278). So, although emotional states were 
not admitted into his agent-oriented, meaning-centered analysis, Weber put the passions at the 
core of his larger theory. For him, only charismatic annunciations can overthrow delegitimized 
worldviews and build new ones on their ruins. 
Although I recognize the overlaps between these two perspectives, I am going to set 
much of this complexity aside in favor of a simplified version to make some broad comparisons. 
According to the pared-down version I wish to employ, both Weber and Durkheim agree that 
shared beliefs are the basis for community. Both argue that “strong belief”—that is, religious 
faith—is a means to escape from existential suffering. The salient difference is that, for Weber, 
belief alleviates human misery by making suffering meaningful within a cosmic order, however 
that order is constituted. Durkheim argues that belief—in its broadest sense—is an emotionally 
compelling expression of unity and collective effervescence; it is only secondarily a system of 
knowledge. 
[h1]Kinds of Belief 
Although belief formed the core of the theories of society proposed by Weber and 
Durkheim, it fell to later writers to categorize kinds of belief. In formulations that have 
influenced several of the articles in this collection, Malcolm Ruel (1982) distinguished between 
weak everyday beliefs and the strongly held beliefs associated with “faith.” Similarly, Joel 
Robbins (2007) contrasted “believing in” propositions that can be tested, easily disproven, and 
are of little import in daily life with “believing that” propositions, which proclaim absolute truth 
and entail strong feelings of commitment to wide-ranging values and premises held on trust. A 
similar point was made by Melford Spiro (1982), who argued that beliefs are differentially 
incorporated and enacted. Any particular individual may know some cultural doctrines only 
vaguely or not at all; others may be understood, but considered wrong or irrelevant; others may 
be accepted only as clichés; others will be internalized and used to guide decisions. Finally, some 
deeply held beliefs serve as motivating forces to instigate action. These are the beliefs that one is 
willing to fight and die defending.5 But these important contrasts between the motivating forces 
of beliefs do not help to explain exactly how beliefs (of any type) are justified and legitimized. 
With all due respect to these previous efforts (and many more I have not the time to 
synopsize), I will here propose my own continuum of belief types, with a somewhat different 
emphasis than any of those above. My main concern is to distinguish types of verification and 
degrees of commitment. Here are some examples: I believe that fire is hot; I believe that an ax is 
a tool for chopping; I believe in gravity; I believe the earth rotates around the sun. I believe that 
the bird I saw was a raven; I believe you left the light on. I am convinced that there is a universal 
conspiracy against me. I believe God speaks to me and that I am his messenger.6 
These beliefs are differentiated on a number of levels. In the first instance, the belief that 
fire is hot is indisputable and proven by immediate personal experience. Fire burns.7 The primary 
significance of an ax is almost, but not quite, as immediately transparent. According to 
Heidegger, as a tool, the ax is “ready to hand” (1962), in that people seeing an ax for the first 
time would not use it as a paddle, or grasp it by the sharp end, or try to cut wood with the handle. 
They might, of course, find secondary uses for it: the blunt side of the head could be a hammer; 
the handle could be a pestle. But the main function of an ax would soon be learned after the most 
rudimentary demonstration—or even intuited without instruction.8 
The next two propositions are more problematic, because they rely on expert evidence 
and collective consensus to supply acceptable explanations for mundane reality. I know from 
experience that most objects do not fly off into the air like balloons when released, but instead 
drop to the earth. Oddly, it is said that heavy and light objects drop at the same rate. Experts have 
told me that the cause of this phenomenon is an invisible force called gravity. In high school I 
studied the scientific explanations for the existence and properties of gravity, and even 
demonstrated my understanding by passing exams. But that was a long time ago and I can no 
longer really remember what I once knew. However, I have no reason to doubt that the invisible 
pull of gravity is indeed the force that holds me to the earth—although I would be willing to 
entertain an alternative account, should any be offered by equally authoritative sources. The 
main thing for me is that gravity, whatever it is, continues to operate in a predictable manner. I 
am not going to attempt to fly. 
Somewhat more difficult to believe is the theory of the heliocentric universe, which 
directly contradicts the evidence of my senses. Yet, although it seems patently obvious that the 
sun revolves around the earth, I have been taught that the truth is the opposite, and the people I 
know also seem convinced that this is the case (although my friends in the frontier of Pakistan, 
where I did my fieldwork, thought that the earth was the center of the universe). In school I 
learned the proofs for heliocentricism, just as I learned about gravity, and these vaguely recalled 
lessons still seem persuasive to me. So I deny the evidence of my senses, bow to the prestige of 
science and to the general consensus, accept the dimly recalled evidence, and firmly believe that 
the earth does revolve around the sun. But, as with gravity, it makes no real difference to my life 
whether I believe in heliocentricism or not. For me, as for my disbelieving Pakistani friends, the 
sun will rise in the East regardless.9 
The next two propositions I’ve listed are more personal and limited in scope, yet they can 
be more significant in practice. Here belief translates as “in my opinion.” These mundane 
statements can be proven wrong, or at least plausibly disputed. For instance, I can be told: “that 
bird was too small to be a raven, it must have been a crow.” Or: “It was you who left the light on, 
not me.” However, although not as sensually evident as belief in the heat of fire or the function 
of an ax, such contestable beliefs can be more relevant for daily life than belief in gravity or the 
solar system. The person who can tell a crow from a raven gains status as a more knowledgeable 
birder; the person convicted of leaving the light on can be blamed when it burns out. If possible, 
contestants in such disputes will attempt to back up their opinions by reference to expert 
knowledge: a book by an ornithologist confirms that ravens are much bigger than crows. But no 
experts are available to prove who left the light on. In that case, eyewitness accounts are sought. 
“Susie, was it me or your mother who left the light on?” 
When external verification is not possible, disputants may rely on personal memory: “I 
distinctly remember that it was you and not me who left the lights on.” This claim aspires to the 
certainty of experiential truth—I am (or want to be) utterly convinced that you left the lights on 
just as surely as I am convinced that fire is hot. But unlike the universal truth of fire, the 
subjective truth of a memory—no matter how clearly recalled—can always be denied by others 
whose memories differ. 
So far, I’ve presented six very simple assertions of belief that traverse a continuum from 
indisputable statements of fact, immediately and subjectively experienced and (relatively) 
universally accepted (fire’s heat, the function of an ax) to less immediately transparent beliefs in 
the existence of gravity and the heliocentric solar system that are (1) objectively verified by 
experiment, (2) ratified by authority, and (3) legitimized by public consensus. In different 
cultural universes these beliefs may well be contested and denied. As I mentioned, the people 
among whom I did my fieldwork thought that the stars and sun revolved around the earth. 
Finally, I’ve mentioned personal beliefs that can be argued over, sometimes calmly, sometimes 
angrily, with results that may lead to shame on the losing side, self-satisfaction on the other side, 
or simply to an exasperated standoff. These beliefs can sometimes be validated by referring to 
recognized experts or eyewitnesses, but sometimes only personal memory and intuition can be 
called on. 
It is this latter option that that opens up an acute epistemological chasm, because reliance 
on inner certainty has the potential (rarely realized) to recede away from beliefs that can be 
legitimized by reference to collectively accepted facts (whether universally felt or intuitively 
grasped, or ratified by authority, proven by scientific experiment, affirmed by general consensus, 
or confirmed by eyewitnesses) and to move toward the unprovable and idiosyncratic. At their 
extremes, internally verified personal beliefs can be very far indeed from the norms of agreed-on 
reality. One such belief is the paranoid fantasy that there is a sinister conspiracy against me. The 
reality of this conspiracy is proven to me by the coded messages I hear broadcast on television or 
find printed in the phone book, by the searches of my room that occur while I sleep (revealed by 
the ever-so-slight shifting of my socks in the drawer), by the noises in my walls caused by 
implanted listening devices, and so on. For the paranoid individual, these subjective beliefs, 
which no one else shares, are far more gripping than ordinary opinions, which can be challenged 
and are liable to falsification or doubt.10 
If stated and strongly affirmed, idiosyncratic beliefs—which certainly need not be the 
product of mental illness, but simply the expression of an active imagination—are likely not to 
be acceptable to those who hold more conventional views. Unless such beliefs are revealed in 
arenas where idiosyncrasy is expected (e.g., the art world), they are either hidden or else must be 
defended against friends, family, neighbors, and therapists. Because of the threat eccentric 
beliefs pose to maintaining the social consensus about reality, the consequences of affirming and 
acting on them can be severe: incarceration, a diet of antipsychotic drugs, shock treatment.11 
However, occasionally what is taken as delusion by some is accepted as a revelation by 
others. At that point we may witness the birth of a new religious cosmology.12 For example, the 
doctrines of Islam were first conveyed to the Prophet Muhammad during a meditative retreat on 
Mount Hira, where he had a vision of the Angel Gabriel, who commanded him to proclaim the 
word of the one God, Allah. Later revelations occurred at intervals, sometimes convulsing the 
Prophet into epileptoid fits, at other times blandly manifested in words or tinkling noises he 
could interpret on arousing, and that were taken to be the direct commands of Allah, speaking 
directly to his messenger. Most of his own close relatives and other pillars of his community 
dismissed his revelations as unprovable, absurd, and dangerous. They were the ravings of a 
lunatic who should be repudiated and destroyed. Yet a core of believers recognized Muhammad 
as the bearer of Allah’s divine instructions and sacrificed home and family to follow him. 
As I mentioned earlier, in the Weberian theory of history, profound social transformation 
begins with the appearance of a charismatic visionary whose appeal exists beyond or outside of 
reason, and who overturns the world as it is. As Jesus proclaimed: “It is written, but I say unto 
you.” For believers, the divine message is an embodied truth, manifested in the actual person of 
the emissary or exemplary prophet.13 The doctrine is true because the prophet proclaims it. Of 
course, not all are convinced. Muhammad’s own relatives were skeptics who sought to kill him. 
The vast majority of would-be prophets fall afoul of the world as it is and pay the price. 
According to the Weberian theory of history, even those prophecies that do succeed are 
doomed to erode over time as the original personal annunciation is rationalized into dogma and 
eventually ossified into tradition. When that occurs, the time is right for the rise of a new 
charismatic leader who announces the advent of another, better world. However, Weber argued 
that this cycle is now over, and that humanity is doomed to the permanent disenchantment of the 
world; religious faith has become merely a “pianissimo” accompaniment to the business of 
achieving and sustaining instrumental efficiency.14 Like Weber, Durkheim also thought that we 
now live in a compromised world where an ideology of self-interested individualism prevails. He 
argued that this was because of the evolution of complexity and the consequent rise of the cult of 
the self. For him, crippling alienation and anomie are the inevitable consequences of the isolating 
social conditions of contemporary organic society, which have made self-loss in revitalizing 
collective ritual performance difficult to achieve. But unlike Weber, he was not pessimistic about 
the fate of faith. “This state of incertitude and confused agitation cannot last forever. A day will 
come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence” (Durkheim 
1965:475). 
[h1]Contrasting Modes of Sustaining “Strong” Belief 
The cases discussed here all take place in settings where the prophet has long been 
absent, where the basic annunciation has long been rationalized, and where the compulsive 
effects of a personal charismatic emotional connection exist only in a highly mediated form.15 
Yet “strong belief” thrives. The data clearly demonstrates that Weber was mistaken and 
Durkheim was correct, although the ways belief has been sustained have not always been as 
“effervescent” as he imagined. The basic question addressed by the authors of the articles in this 
collection is: Exactly how have strong religious beliefs actually been maintained and defended 
despite the threats posed by modern conditions of pluralism and secularization? This question 
has been answered ethnographically by focusing on the logical and psychological strategies, 
subterfuges, and affirmations used by Christians in the United States and Thailand, Buddhists in 
rural and urban Thailand, and Muslims in Indonesia, that allow believers to retain religious faith 
in an age of uncertainty, multiplicity, and empiricism. 
The solutions the authors find to this problem can be usefully placed into the two ideal 
typical camps I outlined earlier. The first solution is based on Durkheimian affirmations of 
identity, emotional commitment, belonging, and authenticity within a sacred community; the 
second solution is a Weberian effort to construct types of legitimated meaning systems that can 
confirm belief. The writers in this collection subtly explore the culturally specific and uniquely 
mixed applications of both of these modes of ratifying faith. 
To sustain their faith, the Emerging Evangelicals documented by James Bielo have 
chosen a Durkheimian path that attempts a reconciliation between modern individualism and the 
compelling power of emotional revelation and collective participation. They practice a 
countercultural version of “missional” Christianity in which a felt spiritual connection is 
discovered within the seeker, thus transcending apparent distinctions and stimulating a 
transformative inner revelation of communion.16 Deeply indebted to New Age philosophy and 
practice, Emerging Evangelicals downplay the importance of dogma and textual learning; 
personally illuminated themselves, they wish to live the message of Jesus in practice. The exact 
content of the call varies from person to person. Yet all agree that it is not to be discovered by 
reading or churchgoing, but only by personal prayer and meditation, which leads to a felt 
experience of the divine inner light. All also agree that this new awareness must then be carried 
into the world in the form of practice. On their mission of salvation, Emerging Evangelicals 
actively oppose the self-centered individualism, corruption, and materialism of the era by 
building egalitarian collectives, sharing goods, living simply, and exemplifying the selfless 
Christian life style through community action. Above all, missional Christianity implies being 
authentic in oneself and in one’s relationships, which means overcoming personal desire and 
expressing inner truth in one’s daily life.17 
In his article on a Quaker community in Scotland, Douglas Kline also finds that the quest 
for inner certainty and a strong and convincing faith correlates with the construction of a sacred 
community of spiritually awakened individuals wherein text and dogma are minimized. He 
argues that the diverse members of the Quaker congregation are able to unite through active 
participation in the open-ended ritual performance of silent worship, personal revelation, and by 
reference to the inclusive trope of a personal spiritual journey. The silent and meditative 
worshippers in a Quaker service may appear to be the direct opposite of ecstatic dancers merged 
together in trance, as portrayed by Durkheim, but their underlying experiences are similar, albeit 
much diluted. In this modern community of individualists, each worshipper supports every other 
seeker’s personal and ongoing quest for inner clarity and “convincement.” Anyone can testify 
whenever moved by the spirit, but no criticism or argument is permitted. All are joined together 
on the journey to ultimate truth (whatever its content)—although some are presumed to be 
farther along the pathway. Nonetheless, no one has the right to control another’s revelation. The 
main mode of discipline is through example.18 The Quakers have constructed a mystical faith 
based on orthopraxy,19 not orthodoxy, in which a search for a felt inner spiritual truth is 
conducted “alone, but together” in a church without a creed (or not much of one). 
Another contribution that examines Christian belief is Julia Cassaniti’s. But her Thai 
subjects follow a very different, much more Weberian, route for keeping their faith. Unlike the 
inwardly focused and experientially oriented congregations described by Kline and Bielo, 
Cassaniti’s Thai Christians are strict textualists. They believe that the word of God is literally 
given in the bible, sent down by an omnipotent creator to save the faithful. For them, salvation 
comes not through transcendent experiences of inner enlightenment, but through dedicated study 
of the divine word and strict obedience to biblical precepts. Their spiritual meaning system is 
externally provided by the unquestioned and unquestionable holy texts; faith is recognized and 
enacted by the believers’ strict adherence to divine commands, which are prescribed in the Holy 
book and conveyed by priests, so that the scripture resembles a manual of expert instruction in 
salvation technology. 
To verify their belief in karma, their Buddhist neighbors employ a different, but equally 
meaning-centered approach. Where the rural Thai Baptists refer continually to the textual 
evidence of divine revelation as the source of their certainty, for rural Thai Buddhists karma is 
not a divine prescription, revealed in a holy text and interpreted by experts but, rather, is a 
mundane fact of life, like gravity, verified daily by experience, and undeniably true whether one 
is a Buddhist or not. This distinction corresponds with major differences in practice: for example, 
Christian prayer supplicates an interventionist God and begs for His intervention; Buddhist 
prayer impersonally creates good karma and a peaceful state of mind in the worshipper.20 
Similarly Weberian is Steven Carlisle’s study of the verification of belief in karma in 
urban Thailand. In his article, he has carefully elucidated some of the mechanisms by which that 
belief has been internalized and the existential purposes that it serves. According to him, like 
their rural cousins, urban Thai Buddhists conceive of karma as automatic and universal in its 
workings and “scientific” in its principles. By imagining a coherent life story based on the 
operations of an inexorable and experientially and scientifically verifiable reality, they are able to 
eliminate complexities and uncertainties in their life narratives without realizing they are doing 
so. The stories they construct legitimate—or at least provide plausible causes for—personal 
sufferings and failures in a way that is convincing and culturally validated, and therefore 
therapeutic. 
Continuing in the Weberian mode, but in a different register, Greg Simon outlines the 
manner in which matrilineal Muslims in Minangkabau, Indonesia, manage to confirm Islamic 
doctrines for themselves despite the fact that the doctrines stand in contradiction to their daily 
practices and taken-for-granted worldview. This disjuncture has become more and more obvious 
as people from Minangkabau have traveled and read about alternative practices associated with 
Islam in its Middle Eastern heartland, such as patrilineality, or heavy veiling of women. The 
problem then is how to square their divergent local realities and their own inner doubts with a 
sacred text that is supposed to be perfect, immediately understandable, and without 
contradiction. Their solution is to achieve “conviction without being convinced.” That is, 
believers develop a cognitive capacity to dismiss disconfirming evidence or practice as illusory, 
despite their seeming truth. 
For example, because the answers to all questions must, by definition, be found in the 
Qur’an, any apparent discordance must be the fault of the questioner, not the book. And, if the 
answer in the Qur’an seems to be in tension with daily reality, then daily reality must be 
dismissed, as one informant says, like a “magic trick,” persuasive in appearance, but false in 
essence. Such an apparently counterfactual belief system requires actively bracketing off or 
subordinating all disconfirming information to get closer to the ultimate reality that is hidden 
from ordinary eyes. But this quest does not require introspection and emotional revelation. 
Rather, it employs a highly conscious casting away of doubts and an active sculpting of 
behaviors and thoughts according to the message of the Prophet. 
Like Thai Buddhists, Muslims in Minangkabau say that their sacred texts have the same 
verity as the laws of nature. The Qur’an is as real as gravity. Believers also often affirm that their 
creed is a practical guide to life, a spiritual tool that functions to provide a secure and easily 
followed pathway through life; those who wander from the path do so because they willfully 
refuse to see the God-given truth, and rely instead on their own fallible subjective judgments and 
personal feelings. At the same time, Islamic texts, if properly understood, will necessarily reveal 
all of the deepest secrets of the universe—even though these truths are seen only “in a mist” by 
ordinary mortals. Through a lifetime of study, some experts can reach a deeper grasp of the 
various implications of the message, and are then qualified to give ordinary people advice about 
the correct Islamic approach to any and all problems of daily life. So the Muslims of 
Minangkabau maintain their faith first by considering their belief system to be self-evidently 
natural, total, and obvious, and then by recognizing and deferring to trained experts who can 
describe and elucidate the principles and implications of their sacred texts. They thereby 
combine the two modes of meaning centered belief described by Cassaniti in her account of rural 
Thai Christians and Buddhists. 
[h1]Internal and External Modes of Achieving Certainty 
At this point I want to integrate my argument, relating the paradigms of Durkheim and 
Weber to the continuum of belief I posited earlier, which begins in immediate, experiential, and 
undeniable facts: fire burns; an ax chops. Less certain are beliefs that are validated by 
experiment, evidence, and public opinion, such as the existence of gravity or the heliocentric 
solar system. Finally, there are personal beliefs or opinions that are open to contestation: a raven 
is bigger than a crow; you left the light on. Generally, these personal beliefs are “ordinary” 
claims about the nature of daily reality—worth arguing about but amenable to resolution by 
reference to expert opinion, general consensus, or eyewitness accounts. 
However, the personal mode of proof has the potential to open up an epistemological gap 
from which truly divergent beliefs may emerge (I am the victim of a universal conspiracy; I am 
the messenger of God). Such beliefs can be troubling, not only for the individual, who may be 
punished for them, but also for society, which may be changed by them when they are 
enunciated at the right time, to the right audience, by a compellingly charismatic individual. 
Then they may be embraced as prophetic revelations, and thereby provide the basis for the rise of 
a sacralized revolutionary worldview that, if victorious, eventually becomes the taken-for-
granted, everyday reality.21 
As the articles demonstrate, to validate and sustain the world-constituting status of 
religiously based belief systems, a number of options are available. The Asian examples assuage 
doubt primarily by relying on external sources for validation of their respective faiths: that is, 
belief is verified by experience (what I believe is an indisputable fact, like fire’s heat or gravity’s 
pull), by practical reason (my religion is transparently true and serves as a pragmatic recipe for 
the proper and natural way to live), by objective experiment (karma can be demonstrated by facts 
and experiment just as it can be demonstrated that the earth revolves around the sun), by 
reference to authoritative texts (the sacred book says so), or to experts (the scientists or teachers 
or priests say so), or by general consensus (everybody says so). These modes of verification all 
fit within the Weberian framework for the legitimization of belief based on the social 
construction of meaning. 
For the Buddhists described in these articles, referring to religious principles as natural 
facts is the main mode of confirmation. Among laymen, karma is not verified by prophecy or 
text, but is presented as a self-evident truth—it is real like the heat of fire or the pull of gravity—
and therefore undeniable. In the same vein, Buddhists assume that practical experience and 
honest reflection will inevitably demonstrate that ordinary suffering has its direct source in the 
inexorable and inevitable operations of karma (although, as Carlisle shows, experience can be 
twisted to conform with the “natural fact” it is supposed to express). In a different mode, the 
Thai Christians described by Cassaniti and the Muslims described by Simon are also concerned 
very much with external verification, in this instance, the accepted and undeniable wisdom of the 
holy texts, although the Muslims rely as well on their belief that Islam is a natural fact; albeit one 
requiring an arduous effort to discern beneath the illusions that permeate daily life. 
In contrast, for the Quakers and emergent evangelicals described in these articles, what 
predominates is a Durkheimian experiential and subjective form of faith that is expressed within 
a supportive collective of fellow believers. Despite differences in the trappings and institutional 
frameworks that surround and enable the experience, for both groups it is the immediacy of 
feeling that counts most, not doctrine or meaning. Although collectively nurtured, these truths 
are subjectively felt as an inner revelation, and so are as indisputable as the heat of a burning 
flame. 
Yet, the opposition between these two ideal typical “styles of belief”—externally verified 
versus internally experienced—is not clear-cut, as the case studies amply demonstrate. For 
example, despite their emphasis on internal “convincement” the Durkheimian Quakers and 
Evangelicals alike refer to and meditate on biblical texts, which serve as points of inspiration. 
For these believers, inner communion also requires the foundation of at least some external 
content. On the other side of the divide, along with various forms of external legitimization of 
their beliefs, Muslims and Buddhists also make use of emotional modes of belief verification. 
The Minangkabau Muslims say that sincere immersion in the practices and beliefs of their 
religion gives them peace of mind. This felt experience—realized in collective prayer—
subjectively verifies their faith. Thai Buddhists also say that their collective acts of devotion 
instill “calm hearts” by putting believers in direct felt contact with the Buddha who resides 
within. This form of worship is parallel to the meditations of the Emerging Evangelicals or 
Quakers who seek a tranquil version of collective effervescence. In an earlier version of her 
article, Cassaniti notes in passing how some Baptist villagers were encouraged by a visiting 
missionary to speak in tongues to remove their doubts and viscerally prove their faith to 
themselves. This evidence indicates that for them too, solely textual forms of verification may 
not always be sufficient sources of spiritual sustenance. These cases show the limits of the ideal 
typical opposition I mentioned in my opening statement. One-sided models for inculcating belief 
(meaning-centered and externally verified vs. emotional and internally substantiated) must be 
supplemented by more inclusive attention to alternatives. Meaning is more compelling when it is 
also embodied and felt; feeling needs to be concretized in external reality to become 
institutionalized. 
An emphasis on one side or the other of the dichotomy also implies certain logical and 
psychic problems. As mentioned, a dogmatic approach to maintaining faith, which enjoins 
obedience to textual dictates and expert knowledge, must thereby discount or deny disconfirming 
data, such as ambivalence within the scriptures, disagreements among experts or, more seriously, 
failures of the sacred texts to jibe with experienced reality. Achieving willful ignorance becomes 
harder and harder to accomplish in the presence of plausible alternative faiths, or when 
confronted by variations in interpretation within a congregation. The psychological response may 
be to cling to threatened beliefs with greater and greater zealotry,22 although this does not seem 
to have been the case (so far) among the Minangkabau 
In contrast, the fuzzy experiential religion practiced by the Emerging Evangelicals and 
the Quakers has the great advantage of being inclusive. In fact, tolerance is built into a faith that 
is based on felt union with an indeterminate but universal inner truth. However, the religion of 
personal revelation has the inherent danger of losing all coherence and becoming mere sensation, 
without moral content. Acolytes also face the insidious difficulty of distinguishing between the 
revelation of the divine spirit and the whisper of personal desire. Is a devotee truly gripped by the 
sacred, or wickedly deluded?23 
[h1]Conclusion 
The articles collected here justify the usual anthropologists’ assertion that we need better 
ethnography, less ungrounded theorizing. Or, in terms of the Sufi story I began with, more bread, 
less abstraction. Through their careful inquiries into the languages and acts mobilized to sustain 
and defend faith, they open new and promising routes for further interrogation into the nature of 
belief and the sources of human motivation and self-constitution. In so doing, they carry on the 
great tradition of social thought, as pioneered by Weber and Durkheim. But they go farther by 
providing in-depth analysis of real situations—particularly in complex situations where faith is 
challenged—and by stepping beyond narrow paradigms to show both the ambiguity and 
authority of the local responses to modern conditions of pluralism, empiricism, and 
disenchantment. Carlisle and Simon persuasively follow the logical twists and turns believers 
negotiate to hide contradictions from themselves, while Kline shows that the Quaker quest for an 
indefinable “Inner Light” fosters collective solidarity, despite very real distinctions within the 
congregation. Cassaniti argues persuasively that different cosmologies and notions of agency 
radically effect the ways faith is expressed and experienced. Beilo explores how Emerging 
Evangelicals reject cultural values of possessive individualism and seek “authentic” collective 
relationships that are paradoxically based on disciplined individual effort. These narratives, in 
attending to complexities, ironies, and ambiguities, reveal that, in the ongoing struggle to retain 
and strengthen belief, emotional experience and the search for meaning operate in dialectical 
counterpoint, not in absolute contradiction, although one side of the equation may predominate 
in any particular case. To begin a truly comparative study of belief, we need more of the sorts of 
nuanced inquiries featured in this collection, which reveal so graphically the ways beliefs are 
defended and incorporated into the worldviews and experiences of ordinary people. 
Of course, as an anthropologist with a different theoretical, methodological, and personal 
background than the authors, I have some criticisms to make about their approaches. For 
instance, the articles suffer from problems endemic to research based mainly on interviews. 
Questions were asked that probably never occurred to local people. Were the replies efforts to 
make the anthropologist happy, or to appear logically coherent? How characteristic were the 
attitudes and reasoning of the interviewees? What differences do their various affirmations of 
belief make in their actual behavior? The contributions tell us a lot about what people say, but 
very little about what they do. To undertake a rigorous comparative study, we need to know 
much more about how peoples’ modes of belief are related to their cultural, historical, political 
contexts. How did these patterns of belief come to be held; what cultural forms and structural 
systems do they correlate with; who are the zealots and who are the lukewarm, how do these 
differences in intensity relate to circumstances? From these articles, we do not get many clues 
about how an individual or collective orientation toward the validation of strong beliefs is 
associated with class, age, ethnicity, or gender; nor do we know much about opposition or 
resistance to dominant belief systems. 
My qualms in no way reflect negatively on the contributions, but they do reflect the 
tensions implicit in our own disciplinary mandate. It is evident that no article, no book, no 
method, and no theory, can ever do full justice to the vast scope of human experience, yet that is 
what anthropology seeks to accomplish. Because of its ambition to explore and explain the full 
gamut of human life, anthropology contains multitudes, so that accepted doctrine and practice for 
one practitioner are destined to be anathema for another. Individually and collectively we pursue 
objective knowledge that can never be fully grasped, never easily distinguished from a form of 
faith, shifting its shape as we pursue it (thus our self-conscious emphasis on problematizing). 
Our continued participation in this quest, and our belief in its value, is the shared meaning 
system and inner experience that unites us, despite differences of approach and character. 
Taken together, these contributions do not just illuminate the ways the beliefs of others 
are maintained. Indirectly, they also ask us how we, the readers, maintain our own. From my 
perspective, the unending struggle to answer this question is at the heart of anthropology: a 
discipline that is a science and an art, as well as an act of faith. 
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1. Weber presented ideal typical cases in full awareness that they were simplified models, 
useful for comparison. He believed that description should show how reality differs from 
the type, and employ cultural and historical data to analyze why this is so. My article is 
written in this spirit. 
2. This might not be a bad thing (see Wierzbicka 1999). 
3. In contrast, Tooker (1992) argues that the religious precepts and rituals of the Akha of 
Thailand are simply formal public expressions of the Akha’s externalized collective 
identity, much like their distinctive headdresses, clothing style, posture, house structure, 
spatial orientation, and so on. The Akha are not believers; they are performers. 
4. For reasons of space, I ignore Asad’s discussion of the relationship of power to the 
instantiation of belief. 
5. Spiro contends that to understand the reasons why some beliefs are motivating and 
some are not, the analyst would have to attend to the degree and manner in which any 
cultural norm had been internalized. This would require a comparative study of the 
effects of differential socialization practices within a population over a long period of 
time. To my knowledge, this difficult program has never been carried out. 
6. I note that Cassaniti’s rural Thai informants tell her that belief (quam chuea in Thai) 
only refers to confidence in the truth of something that cannot be empirically 
demonstrated. Such categorical linguistic distinctions are well worth exploring. However, 
the logic of my typology still holds even if the terms referring to the different sources of 
confidence differ. See also endnote 20. 
7. I believe in the heat of fire even though reliable sources tell me that some people can 
walk on hot coals or pass flames across their bodies without being burned. I am 
impressed by this secondhand information, but my visceral fear of being burnt takes 
priority. 
8. Of course, the ax can also acquire any number of symbolic meanings and forms that 
may or may not reflect its original usage. Nonetheless, even if other secondary and 
serendipitous uses of an ax are theoretically possible, and even if any number of symbolic 
meanings can be attached to an ax, I making the commonsense claim that its original 
functional purpose as a tool has logical priority—an ax is a chopper par excellence. 
9. See Nussbaum (2001) for a discussion. I assume that for me to be able to blissfully 
ignore the scientific principles that underpin the theories of gravity and heliocentricism, 
experts must exist who do understand those principles, and who make use of them to 
create the world I take for granted. For an anthropological discussion of expertise and 
culture, see Barth (1993, 2002). 
10. Clinicians generally recognize psychosis as a mental state in which reality is obscured 
by hallucinations and incoherent thoughts, resulting in a serious impairment of ordinary 
social interactions. Psychotics often show a remarkable ability to maintain their delusions 
regardless of the impositions of “reality.” 
11. For a classic example, see Daniel Paul Schreber’s famous memoir (1955) as well as 
Freud’s analysis of Schreber’s case (1996). 
12. For a comparison between delusional mental states and strong religious faith, see 
William James (1982). For more on the social-cultural relationship of charisma, 
exclusion, and prophecy see Lindholm (1990). 
13. In Weber’s theory, the emissary makes no claims to divinity, but is a messenger who 
brings the commands of God to the disciples. The exemplary prophet, in contrast, 
embodies the divine principle. Muhammad is an emissary prophet par excellence. 
Buddha is the paradigm of the exemplary prophet. However, as always in Weber’s 
typologies, there is considerable overlap between the two. Pious Muslims emulate 
Muhammad, down to his hair color, and assign him semidivine powers, while Buddhists 
portray their prophet as a mortal man who promoted a specific doctrine of compassion. 
14. As Peter Berger (1967) pointed out, in the modern context sacralized worldviews are 
doubly threatened by the existence of alternative religious annunciations and by the 
increasingly hegemonic scientific belief system. 
15. According to Greenfeld (1985), Weber divides charisma into a primary irrational 
form that is emotional and personal, while its weakened secondary form is attached to 
sacred symbols that faintly represent its original expression. Anthropologists, such as 
Clifford Geertz (1985), following Shils (1965), have tended to focus only on this latter 
aspect of charisma. 
16. William James (1982) calls this the religion of the once born. He believed it would 
become the dominant form of religious annunciation in the future. 
17. See also Stromberg (1993). The this-worldly mission of Emergent Evangelists is 
reminiscent of the this-worldly asceticism Weber attributed to Calvinists, but the 
Evangelist’s emotional connection to a directive personal divine revelation is the reverse 
of Calvinism, which repudiates all forms of enthusiasm and mysticism. 
18. Although some rules do exist, they serve mainly to minimize disruptions in the 
meeting. As might be expected in a religion stressing personal revelation, enforcing these 
rules sometimes leads to splits in the congregation. 
19. For this formulation, see Smith (1957). 
20. On these grounds, Cassaniti says the assumption that “belief” is an attitude 
prerequisite for religious belief is unfounded, and is a product of Christian eschatology, 
irrelevant for understanding her Buddhist material. From the perspective I’ve presented, a 
naturalistic Buddhist “belief” affirms that karma exists as an undeniable and provable fact 
of life for everyone. 
21. For an exploration of recent examples, see Lindholm and Zúquete (2010). 
22. This point was famously made by David Hume (1956). 
23. This is a problem faced by all mystical religions, and is often resolved by recourse to 
the judgment of a spiritual guide who, in recognition of his past success on the path, is 
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